Empirical evidence documents a tight link between aggregate and firm-level investment and corporate credit spreads. Moreover, it has been shown that credit spreads largely reflect a compensation for bearing macroeconoimc risks. We use a tractable model with recursive preferences and time varying macroeoconomic risk to investigate the link between aggregate risk and corporate policies in a production economy. Quantitatively, the model generates large and realistic credit spreads and replicates the empirical evidence on investment and credit spreads. Crucially, we document that the link between credit spreads and investment is driven by risk premia. We therefore highlight the importance of accounting for macroeconomic risks in explaining corporate financing and investment decisions in the presence of financing and real frictions.
Introduction
A growing body of empirical work indicates that firms' real investment decisions are affected by the corporate bond market. In particular, there is now substantial evidence that the aggregate default spread predicts aggregate investments (Lettau and Ludvigson (2002) ). Similarly, Philippon (2009) shows that a bond market based Q explains most of the variation in aggregate investments whereas an equity market based Q fails. At the firm level, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2007) show that investments are correlated with bond yields. 1
To successfully study the link between investments and corporate bond yields from a theoretical perspective, it is crucial to account for the price of aggregate risk. On the one hand, bond yields reflect expected default rates and losses. On the other hand, as corporate bonds tend to default in bad times when marginal utility is high, risk averse investor will require a risk compensation for holding these assets. Recent theoretical and empirical evidence, however, suggests that the risk premium component accounts for most of the level and variation of corporate bond spreads (see for instance Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) , Huang and Huang (2003) , Almeida and Philippon (2007) and Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2009) ). Furthermore, dynamic corporate financing decisions, which are important determinants of credit spreads, are also likely to be driven by macroeconomic factors as shown, for example, in Korajczyk and Levy (2003) .
The aim of this paper is to provide an economic framework to relate firms' investment and financing decisions to the pricing of aggregate risk. The methodological novelty of this paper is to use Epstein-Zin preferences with time varying macroeconomic risk in consumption and productivity in a cross-sectional production economy with risky corporate debt. Similar to Bansal and Yaron (2004) , we model time varying macroeconomic risk as a mean reverting 1 Using both the aggregate time-series and firm-level data, Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2009) find strong support for the view that the relationship between uncertainty and investment is inuenced by the presence of credit market frictions. A related strand of literature studies the impact of financing frictions on investments, for instance Gomes (2001) . This literature is motivated by the sensitivity of investments to cash flows as documented by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) , Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997). process in the first and second moments of consumption growth. In contrast to a representative agent with power utility, an agent with Epstein-Zin preferences is not indifferent to the resolution of intertemporal macroeconomic risk. We assume that she dislikes intertemporal macroeconomic risk and it is therefore reflected in the valuation of debt and equity.
Firms choose optimal real investments in physical capital to maximize equity value. These investments can be financed with retained earnings, equity issuances or debt. In contrast to corporate models of default, such as Leland (1994) , where the tax advantage of debt leads firms to issue debt, it is availability of a real investment option in our model. We assume debt takes the form of a one period bond and firms choose optimal leverage to maximize equity value. Importantly, firms can default on their outstanding debt when the option to default is more valuable than paying back bond holders. When making these dynamics decisions, firms face costs in adjusting the capital stock as well as debt and equity issuances costs.
In the presence of these financing frictions, firms' investment and financing decisions highly depend on the availability and pricing of external financing. Especially the value of debt is affected by intertemporal macroeconomic risk since the firms' default option becomes highly valuable after persistent adverse shocks. As a result, firms' default decisions cluster in bad times when macroeconomic risk is high. Credit spreads thus contain a large and countercylical compensation for these risks whereas investments tend to be pro-cyclical. With this economic mechanism in hand, our model is able to replicate the predictive power of aggregate credit spreads for aggregate investment growth. Consequently, our model rationalizes the tight link between investments and credit spreads, as documented widely in the empirical literature.
A common approach in corporate finance as well as macroeconomic models is to ignore the pricing of aggregate risk. Typically, in these models quantity dynamics are largely unaffected by movements in risk premia, implying a separation of quantity and prices as in Tallarini (2000) . In contrast, our results suggest that this separation breaks down in the presence of financing frictions. In particular, we decompose credit spreads in an expected default and risk premium component. In aggregate regressions of simulated data, it is the risk component in credit spreads which drives most of the time variation in aggregate investment growth. We thus highlight the importance of accounting for macroeconomic risks in explaining corporate financing and investment decisions.
Quantitatively, our framework is also successful in rationalizing the historical evidence on credit spreads. As pointed out by Huang and Huang (2003) , standard models of credit risk, such as Merton (1974) and Leland (1994) , are not able to generate a realistic spread of risky debt relative to safe governments bonds. In contrast, our model generates a realistic credit spread of 101 basis points for 5 year debt and 114 basis points for 10 year debt for BBB firms, close to empirical estimates. At the same time, actual default probabilities are low as in the data.
The reason for success is twofold. First, we measure credit spreads in the cross section of firms as in Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2009) . The usual approach is to measure credit spreads when firms issue new debt. In reality, however, firms adjust leverage only infrequently as shown by Leary and Roberts (2005) . Cross sectional heterogeneity raises the average credit spread because the value of the default option is convex in capital.
Second, and more importantly, firms face costs when they sell capital. So far, the corporate bond pricing literature has focused on endowment economy models where firms' earnings streams are exogenous. In contrast, in our production economy earnings are endogenous and firms could sell capital to pay off debt. As a result, firms would never default and credit spreads would be unrealistic small. Essentially, the value of the disinvestment option drives out the value of the default option.
A crucial ingredient of our model are symmetric adjust costs which make it very costly for firms to sell capital. This assumption reduces the value of the disinvestment option and leads to optimal default when the prospects for a firm are sufficiently bad. A similar feature of production economies has been noted by Jermann (1998) . He points out that explaining the equity risk premium in a production economy is much more challenging than in an endowment economy since the agent can use capital to smooth the consumption stream.
He also demonstrates that investment frictions are crucial for generating a realistic equity premium in general equilibrium production economies.
Our model also provides new testable implications. When firms decide to expand capacity, they exercise a real option which leads to predictable movements in future returns. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) confirm this intuition in the data. On the other hand, firms finance these capacity expansions partly with debt in our model. Firms thus swap the real option with the default option. Consequently, our framework prescribes a positive relation between firm level investments and credit spreads. The empirical credit risk literature, for instance Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) , has ignored investment expenditures as determinant of credit spreads because in the typical credit risk model earnings and investments are exogenous.
Related Literature
Our paper is at the center of several converging lines of literature. First, a growing literature attempts to quantitatively understand firm level investment by linking it to corporate financial policies in settings with financial frictions. While early influential work (see for instance Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Gomes (2001) ) was motivated by the cash-flow sensitivity of corporate investment and considered reduced form representations of the costs of external finance, more recently the literature has considered full fledged capital structure choices, allowing for leverage, default and equity issuance (a partial list includes Cooley and Quadrini (2001) , Moyen (2004) , Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Hennessy and Whited (2007) ). These papers suggest that in the presence of financial frictions, the availability and pricing of external funds is a major determinant of corporate investment. The novelty in our work is the analysis of the role of macroeconomic risk for corporations' investment and financing policies. In particular, while the extant literature has considered settings without aggregate risk, we stress its importance in generating the observed levels and dynamics of the costs of debt. Specifically, our model is consistent with the fact that a large fraction of both level and time-variation of credit spreads is accounted for by risk premia.
In this regard, our paper is related to recent work using dynamic models of leverage to price corporate bonds (Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) , Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2009 ), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2009 ), Chen (2008 ). Motivated by the credit spread puzzle, the observation pointed out by Huang and Huang (2003) that standard structural models of corporate finance in the tradition of Merton are unable to rationalize the historical levels of credit spreads, this literature has stressed the importance of accounting for macroeconomic risk in explaining corporate bond prices. We add to this literature by explicitly considering the role of investment in determining corporations' financing needs and policies.
While the extant literature considered endowment economies only, our analysis stresses that frictions to adjusting firms' assets are a crucial determinant of default decisions, and therefore credit spreads.
Our work is also related to a growing literature on dynamic quantitative models investigating the implications of firms' policies on asset returns. A number of papers (a partial list includes Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) , Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003) , Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) and Zhang (2005) ) has successfully related anomalies in the cross section of stock returns such as the value premium to firms' investment policies. Another recent line of research has focused on the link between firms' financing decisions and stock returns (some recent papers include Garlappi and Yan (2008) , Livdan, Sapriza, and Zhang (2009) and Gomes and Schmid (2009) ). By relating risk premia in corporate bond prices to firms' investment and financing policies, our work here is complementary. Moreover, from a methodological point of view, it adds a long run risk perspective to the literature on the cross-section of stock returns by providing a tractable way of modeling firms' exposure to long run movements in aggregate consumption growth in the sense of Bansal and Yaron (2004) .
More generally, the paper adds to the broad literature on dynamic models of firms' debt policies subject to transaction costs along the lines of Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) , Leland (1994) , Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) and Strebulaev (2007) . Here the novelty in our work is the endogeneity of investment and we provide an analysis of both financial and real transaction costs.
Model
In this section, we first derive the pricing kernel of the representative agent. We assume the representative agent has recursive preferences and the conditional first and second moments of consumption growth are time varying and follow a persistent Markov chain. An important implication of recursive preferences is that the agent is averse to intertemporal risk coming from the Markov chain. These assumptions give rise to realistic level and dynamics for the market price of risk.
In the second subsection, we describe the firm's problem. Firms choose optimal investments to maximize their equity value. Investments are financed by retained earnings as well as equity or debt issuances. Firms can default on their outstanding debt if prospects are sufficiently bad.
Pricing Kernel
The representative agent maximizes recursive utility, U t , over consumption following Kreps and Porteus (1978) , Epstein and Zin (1989) , and Weil (1989) , given by
where C t denotes consumption, β ∈ (0, 1) the rate of time preference, ρ = 1 − 1/ψ and ψ the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), and γ relative risk aversion (RRA). Implicit in the utility function (1) is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) time aggregator and CES power utility certainty equivalent.
Epstein-Zin preferences provide a separation between the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and relative risk aversion. These two concepts are inversely related when the agent has power utility. Intuitively, the EIS measures the agents willingness to postpone consumption over time, a notion well-defined under certainty. Relative risk aversion measures the agents aversion to atemporal risk across states. Recursive preferences also imply preference for either early or late resolution of uncertainty which are crucial for the quantitative implications of this paper.
We assume that aggregate consumption follows a random walk with a time-varying drift and volatility
where µ(s t ) and σ(s t ) depend on the aggregate state of the economy denoted by s t and η t+1 are i.i.d. standard normal innovations. The aggregate state, s t , follows a persistent Markov chain with transition matrix P .
The Epstein-Zin pricing kernel is given by
where Z t denotes the wealth-consumption ratio and θ = 1−γ 1−1/ψ . When θ = 1, the pricing kernel reduces to the one generated by a representative agent with power utility, implying that she is indifferent with respect to intertemporal macroeconomic risk. When the EIS is greater than the inverse of relative risk aversion (ψ > 1/γ), the agent prefers intertemporal risk due to the Markov chain to be resolved sooner rather than later.
A economy which is solely driven by i.i.d. shocks, the wealth-consumption ratio is constant.
In our model, however, the first and second moments of consumption growth follow a Markov chain. Consequently, the wealth-consumption ratio is a function of the state of the economy, i.e., Z t = Z(s t ). Based on the Euler equation for the return on wealth, the wealth-consumption ratio vector Z t solves the system of nonlinear equations defined by
To compute credit spreads, we define the n-period risk-rate as R (n)
Profits and Investment
We begin by considering the problem of a typical value maximizing firm in a perfectly competitive environment. The flow of after tax operating profits, Π, for firm i is described by the
where X i,t is a productivity shock and K i,t denotes the book value of the firm's assets. We use τ to denote the corporate tax rate, 0 < α < 1 the capital share of production and f ≥ 0 proportional costs of production.
The i-th firm productivity shock follows a random walk with a time-varying drift and volatility
where µ x (s t ) and σ x (s t ) depend on the aggregate state of the economy and ε i,t+1 are truncated standard normal shocks which are uncorrelated with the aggregate shock η t+1 . 2 The assumption that ε i,t+1 is firm specific requires that
Firm are allowed to scale operations by choosing the level of productive capacity K i,t .
This can be accomplished through investment, I i,t , which is linked to productive capacity by the standard capital accumulation equation
where δ > 0 denotes the depreciation rate of capital. As in Zhang (2005), we assume that firms face convex but asymmetric adjustment costs when they decide to change their capital stock given by
where the adjustment cost parameter θ i,t depends on whether investments are positive or negative.
Financing
Corporate investment as well as any distributions can be financed with either internal funds generated by operating profits or net new issues which can take the form of new debt (net of repayments) or new equity. We assume that debt, B i,t , takes the form of a one period bond that pays a coupon c i,t . Thus we allow the firm to refinance the entire value of its outstanding liabilities in every period. Formally, letting B i,t denote the book value of outstanding liabilities for firm i at the beginning of period t we define the value of net new issues as
Note that both debt and coupon payments will exhibit potentially significant time variation and will depend on a number of firm and aggregate variables.
When firms change the amount of debt outstanding, they incur a cost. We define debt issuance costs in terms of changes in the level of outstanding debt, B i,t+1 − B i,t . Since the productivity shock has a time trend, we will have to solve the stationary problem which only allows costs to be constant returns to scale. Consequently, we assume that debt issuance costs are proportional to changes in the level of outstanding debt
Firms can also raise external finance by means of seasoned equity offerings. For added realism, we assume that these issues entail additional costs so that firms will never find it optimal to simultaneously pay dividends and issue equity. Following the existing literature,
we consider proportional costs which we denote by λ. 3 Formally, letting E i,t denote the net payout to equity holders, total issuance costs are given by the function
where the indicator function I {Ei,t<0} implies that these costs apply only in the region where the firm is raising new equity finance when net payout, E i,t , is negative.
Investment, equity payout, and financing decisions must meet the following identity between uses and sources of funds
where again E i,t denotes the equity payout. Note that the resource constraint (11) recognizes the tax shielding effects of both depreciated capital and interest expenditures. Distributions to shareholders, denoted D i,t are then given as equity payout net of issuance costs
Valuation
The equity value of the firm, V i,t , is defined as the discounted sum of all future equity distributions. We assume that equity holders will choose to close the firm and default on their debt repayments if the prospects for the firm are sufficiently bad, i.e., whenever V i,t reaches zero.
The complexity of the problem is reflected in the dimensionality of the state space necessary to construct the equity value of the firm. This includes both aggregate and idiosyncratic components of demand, productive capacity, and total debt liabilities, defined as
We can now characterize the problem facing equity holders, taking coupon payments as given. These payments will be determined endogenously below. Shareholders jointly choose investment (the next period capital stock) and financing (next period total debt commitments) strategies to maximize the equity value of each firm, which accordingly can then be computed as the solution to the following dynamic program
Ki,t+1,Li,t+1
where the expectation in the left hand side is taken by integrating over the conditional distributions of X i,t+1 . Note that the first maximum captures the possibility of default at the beginning of the current period, in which case the shareholders will get nothing. 4 Finally, aside from the budget constraint embedded in the definition of D i,t , the firms face capital adjustment costs (8), debt (9) and equity issuance costs (10).
Default and Bond Pricing
We now turn to the determination of the required coupon payments, taking into account the possibility of default by equity holders. Assuming debt is issued at par, the market value of new issues must satisfy the following Euler condition
where W i,t+1 denotes the recovery on a bond in default and I {Vit+1=0} is an indicator function that takes the value of one when the firm defaults and zero when it remains active.
We follow Hennessy and Whited (2007) and specify the deadweight losses at default to consist of a proportional component. Thus, creditors are assumed to recover a fraction of the firm's current assets and profits net of liquidation costs. Formally the default payoff is equal to
Since the equity value V i,t+1 is endogenous and itself a function of the firm's debt commitments this equation cannot be solved explicitly to determine the value of the coupon payments, c i,t . However, using the definition of L i,t , we can rewrite the bond pricing equation
Given this expression and the definition of L i,t , we can easily deduce the implied coupon payment as
Note that defining L i,t as a state variable and constructing the bond pricing schedule B i,t+1
according to (17) 
Credit Spreads
For tractability reasons, we solve for the optimal amount of one period debt. In the calibration, we set one period equal to one quarter. In reality, however, firms issue debt with several years of maturity. To consider the pricing implications for 5 and 10 year debt, we price hypothetical long horizon debt. 5 Assume firm i borrows the amount B (n) i,t for n-periods.
Under the assumption that debt is issued at par, the n-period bond price must satisfy the following Euler condition
where c (n) i,t denotes the n-period coupon rate. 6 The bond pricing equation (19) can be solved for the arbitrage-free coupon rate c
where
i,t is the recovery rate in the case of default. Since we solve the model on a grid, the coupon rate can be easily computed by iterating over the expectations operators without having to rely on Monte-Carlo simulations as in Bhamra, Kuehn, and
Since we price zero coupon debt, the coupon rate is also the yield on the outstanding debt.
Thus, the n-period credit spread is defined as s (n)
f,t . Using Equation (20) for the coupon rate, credit spreads can be expressed as
and
where ξ (n) i,t is the value of a state conditional Arrow-Debreu claim that pays one unit of consumption if the firm defaults in period t + n and χ (n) i,t is the value of the recovery rate in default. Equation (21) shows that the credit spread is zero if default does not occur in expectations, implying that both ξ To gain a better understanding of the Arrow-Debreu claim of default, we decompose it into three terms
where the covariance captures a risk compensation for holding default risk, E t [I {Vi,t+n=0} ] is the expected actual probability of default and R (n) f,t the risk-free rate. Since defaults tend to 6 Here we slightly abuse notation since B
i,t = Bi,t+1 and c
(1)
occur in bad times when marginal utility is high, the covariance is positive. Consequently, credit spreads are high if the risk compensation and actual default probabilities are high or if discount rates are low.
Similarly, the value of the recovery rate can be written as
The first term is the expected cash flow discounted using the risk-free rate and the second term, the covariance, is a compensation for risk. Since marginal utility is counter-cyclical in our model and recovery rates tend to be pro-cyclical, the covariance is negative. Thus, credit spreads are large if our model endogenously generates a pro-cyclical recovery rate.
Empirical Results
In this section, we present the quantitative implications of our model. Since the model does not entail a closed-form solution, we solve it numerically. In the following, we first explain our calibration and then we provide numerical results.
Calibration
In order to solve the model numerically, we calibrate it to quarterly frequency. Our calibration is summarized in Regarding the preference parameters of the representative agent, we assume relative risk aversion (γ) of 10, an elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψ) of 2 and rate of time preference (β) of 0.995 which are common values in the asset pricing literature to generate a realistic market price of risk.
At the firm level, we set the capital share of production equal to 0.65 in line with the evidence in Cooper and Ejarque (2003) . Capital depreciates at 3% quarterly rate as in Cooley and Prescott (1995) . Firms face proportional costs of production of 2% similar to Gomes (2001) . Since there are no direct estimates of the conditional first and second moments of the technology shock, we follow Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2007) and scale the drift by 2.3 and the volatility by 6.6 relative to the respective moments of the consumption process.
Firms can issue debt and equity. We set proportional equity issuance costs at 2% which is consistent with Gomes (2001) and Hennessy and Whited (2007) . Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) estimate bond issuance costs to be around 1.3%. We thus assume proportional debt issuance costs of 2%. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) report default costs of about 10%-25% of asset value and Hennessy and Whited (2007) estimate default losses to be around 10%. In line with the empirical evidence, we set bankruptcy costs at 20%. The corporate tax rate τ is 15% as in Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2009) .
Most of the following quantitative results are based on simulations. Instead of repeating the simulation procedure, we summarize it here. We simulate 1,000 economies for 120 years each consisting of 3,000 firms. We delete the first 20 years of simulated data as burn in period.
Defaulting firms are replaced with new born firms, which start at the steady state level capital and debt, such that the mass of firms is constant over time.
Pricing
Before we report quantitive implications for financing policies, we are interested whether our specification for the consumption process and the pricing of the market return and risk-free asset are in line with the data. To this end, we report unconditional moments generated by the consumption and equity value process in All moments are annualized. The data is taken from Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2007) .
Our calibration for the Markov model (2) for consumption is largely consistent with the data. The unconditional mean and volatility of consumption growth match the data well but realized consumption is not persistent enough. Since the asset pricing implications of recursive preferences are mainly driven by the persistence of the Markov process, this feature of the Markov process lowers the market price of risk and explains why the aggregate market return is lower in the model than in the data. The average unconditional risk-free rate generated by the model is similar in the data but it is not volatile enough. In the model, the risk-free rate changes with the state of the Markov chain and its persistence causes a very stable risk-free rate over time.
Corporate Policies
In Table 3 , we report unconditional moments of optimal corporate policies generated by the model. This table shows cross simulation averages of the average annual investment to asset ratio and its volatility, the frequency of equity issuances, average new equity to asset ratio, average book to market ratio and its volatility, book leverage and market leverage. The data are from Hennessy and Whited (2007) , Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) and Covas and Den Haan (2007) . Table 3 illustrates that the corporate financing and investment policies are generally consistent with the data. Based on the calibrated parameter values for depreciation and capital adjustment costs, the model is able to match the average investment to asset ratio and its volatility. The magnitude of the equity issuance costs parameter renders a realistic frequency of equity issuances but the magnitude of equity issuance to assets in place is slightly too large.
The average book to market ratio is related to the curvature in production function as well as the investment and default option. Without the default option, the market to book ratio would be lower and closer to the data.
The most important statistics of this table are book and market leverage. Since one goal of this paper is to generate a realistic credit spread, it is crucial that the model implied leverage ratios are compatible with empirical estimates. This is important since credit spreads are increasing in default risk coming from leverage. Book leverage is defined as the ratio of the value of outstanding debt relative to the sum of debt and the book value of capital, i.e.
B/(B +K) and market leverage uses a similar definition but replaces the book value of capital with its market value, i.e. B/(B + V ). Even though book leverage is larger in the model than in the data, average market leverage is close to empirical estimates for BBB rated firms.
Credit Spreads
It is well known that the standard corporate bond models of default, such as Merton (1974) or Leland (1994) , fail to explain observed credit spreads given historical default probabilities.
This fact has been first established in Huang and Huang (2003) and is called the credit spread puzzle. The puzzle is that fairly safe BBB rated firms barely default over a finite time horizon but at the same time these bonds pay a large compensation for holding default risk in terms of a credit spread. For instance, the historical default rate of BBB rated firms is around 2% over a 5 year horizon but the yield of BBB firms relative to AAA rated firms is around 100 basis points. We summarize the empirical evidence in Table 4 A common approach in the corporate bond pricing literature is to study the corporate policy of an individual firm at the initial date when the firm issues debt. The reason for this approach is that in the standard Leland (1994) model firms issue debt only once and thus in the long run leverage vanishes. In contrast, in our framework firms can rebalance their outstanding debt every period. Similar to Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2009) , we study credit spreads in the cross section of firms.
To gauge whether our model generates a realistic credit spread, we simulate panels of firms as explained above. In Table 5 , we report average equally-weighted credit spreads and actual default probabilities for 5 and 10 year debt. For 5 year debt, our model generates a credit spread of 101 basis points relative to 103 basis points in the data. For 10 year debt, the model implied credit spread is 114 basis points relative to 130 basis points in the data.
At the same time, actual default probabilities are small. Over a five year horizon, on average 1.24% of firms default and over a 10 year horizon 2.56% of firms. Importantly, the model implied default rates are smaller than in the data. Consequently, our investment based model can generate realistic credit spreads jointly with default probabilities and market leverage.
To gain a better understanding of mechanism driving credit spreads, we use the decomposition provided in Equations (21) to (23). Figure 2 displays actual default probabilities, Decomposition (21) shows that credit spreads increase in the value of Arrow-Debreu claims that pay one unit of consumption in the case of default. These Arrow-Debreu claims, on the other hand, increase in actual default probabilities and a risk compensation for bearing default risk but decrease in the risk-free rate. Figure 2 illustrates that a higher capital level lowers default probabilities but that more debt liabilities raise default probabilities which is an intuitive result. Moreover, actual default probabilities are higher in recessions (blue line) than in booms (red line) when the drift in productivity is lower and idiosyncratic shocks are more volatile. Default probabilities also increase over in booms but decrease over time in recessions. The same conclusions hold for the value of Arrow-Debreu default claims as shown in Figure 3 . Figure 4 illustrates that credit spreads fall with capital but rises with debt.
Moreover, credit spreads are counter-cyclical and increase over time in booms and recessions.
Investments and Credit Spreads
A growing body of empirical work indicates that firms' real investment decisions are affected by the corporate bond market. In particular, there is now substantial evidence that credit spreads predict aggregate investment growth (Lettau and Ludvigson (2002) ). Similarly, Philippon (2009) shows that a bond market based Q explains most of the variation in aggregate investments whereas an equity market based Q fails.
In this section, we aim to replicate the first finding with our model. In Table 6 , we regress next quarter's aggregate investment growth, ∆I t+1 , on the aggregate credit spread, s t ,
In the data, we use quarterly real private fixed investments and as a measure of the aggregate default spread we use the difference between the yield of seasoned BBB and AAA rated firms as reported by Moody's. The data is at quarterly frequency and covers the period 1955.Q1 to 2009.Q2. We run the same regression in the data and on simulated data. In the model, aggregate investment is the sum of firm level investment decisions and the aggregate credit spread is the average equally-weighted credit spread across firms with 10 year maturity.
In Figure 1 we plot both time series. The negative correlation between the credit market and investments is apparent, meaning that more costly access to debt markets causes a reduction in real investments. Specifically, the first regression of Table 6 shows that a one percent increase in the annualized credit spread leads to reduction of 1.7% in investments with an R 2 of 7.7%. This estimated sensitivity is both statistically and economically significant.
Using simulated panels of firms, our model can reproduce the sensitivity of investments to the costs of borrowing. The second regression of Table 6 shows that aggregate investments falls by 1.5% after a one percent increase in the aggregate credit spread which is close to the empirical estimate.
A common approach in corporate finance as well as macroeconomic models is to ignore the pricing of aggregate risk. Typically, in these models quantity dynamics are largely unaffected by movements in risk premia, implying a separation of quantity and prices as in Tallarini (2000) . To demonstrate that such a separation breaks down in the presence of financing frictions, we alternatively price debt when the agent is risk neutral. In this case, the expectations are not taken under the risk neutral but the actual measure and the bond pricing relation
The risk neutral couponc only reflects actual default probabilities but no compensation for bearing default risk. The risk neutral credit spread is the difference between the risk neutral coupon and the risk-free rate with identical maturities.
The third regression of Table 6 shows that the risk neutral credit spread looses its ability to forecast future investment growth. This finding implies that it is the risk component in credit spreads which drives most of the time variation in aggregate investment growth. We thus highlight the importance of accounting for macroeconomic risks in jointly explaining corporate financing and investment decisions.
Conclusion
In the presence of financial frictions, firms' investment policies depend crucially on the availability and pricing of external funds, such as debt and equity. Recent empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that a large fraction of the level and time variation of corporate bond prices are driven by risk premia, compensating bondholders for bearing aggregate risk. This sug-gests that macroeconomic risk is a major determinant of corporate investment and financing policies. We address this question quantitatively with a novel framework that allows us to assess the impact of macroeconomic risk on corporate policies. Specifically, we use EpsteinZin preferences in conjunction with time varying macroeconomic risk in consumption and productivity in a setting with a continuum of heterogeneous firms. These firms make optimal investment decisions in physical capital which they can finance using retained earning, debt or equity. We assume that both equity and debt issuances entail costs and, most importantly, that firms can default on their debt outstanding when they find it optimal to do so. Because in our model firms' default decisions and losses cluster in bad times when macroeconomic risk is high, investors with Epstein-Zin preferences want to be compensated for bearing these risks. This allows our model to generate a high, volatile and sharply countercyclical credit spread, just as in the data. From a quantitative perspective, we therefore document how to obtain a realistic term structure of credit spreads in a production economy and point to the importance of simultaneously accounting for real and financial frictions when explaining corporate policies. Accordingly, the model rationalizes the tight link between investment and conditions in the corporate bond market. When macroeconomic risk is high, risk premia in corporate bond prices are high, making it extremely costly for firms to obtain external financing to fund investment expenditures and depressing investment. Quantitatively, the model replicates the forecasting power of credit spreads for firms' investment. Moreover, decomposing credit spreads into an expected loss and a risk premium component, we document that the bulk of this forecasting power comes from the risk premium. This finding highlights that accounting for macroeconomic risk in explaining corporate policies is crucial.
Appendix

A Stationary Problem
To save on notation, we drop the index i and ignore the default option in the following.
Because of the homogeneity of the value function and the linearity of the constraints, we can rescale the value function by X t
We define the following stationary variables
The pricing kernel is given by
and the stationary value function v(k t , b t , s t , ∆x t ) solves
The stationary value function is four dimensional because the Markov state s t matters for the pricing kernel and ∆x t for detrending dividends as shown below.
The linear constraints in the model can now be expressed in terms of stationary variables
The stationary total debt liabilities are
implying that
We can rewrite the bond pricing equation (15) in terms of stationary variables by detrending it with X t
where the stationary recovery value in default is Table 2 : Aggregate Moments In this table, we report unconditional moments generated by the consumption process and the firm model. We simulate 1,000 economies for 100 years each consisting of 3,000 firms. This table shows cross simulation averages where E[∆c] denotes mean consumption growth, σ(∆c) consumption growth volatility, AC 1 (∆c) the first-order autocorrelation of consumption growth, E[r f ] mean risk-free rate, σ(r f ) risk-free rate volatility, E[r m ] average market rate, and σ(r m ) stock market volatility. All moments are annualized. The data are from Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2007) . Hennessy and Whited (2007) , Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) and Covas and Den Haan (2007 Duffee (1998) are for bonds with no option-like features, taken from the Fixed Income Dataset, University of Houston, for the period Jan 1973 to March 1995, where maturities from 2 to 7 years are short, 7 to 15 are medium, and 15 to 30 are long. For Huang and Huang (2003) , short denotes a maturity of 4 years and medium of 10 years. The data used in David (2008) are taken from Moody's and medium denotes a maturity of 10 years. For Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) , the data are taken from the National Association of Insurance Companies; short denotes a maturity from 1 to 7 years, medium 7 to 15 years, and long 15 to 30 years. In the data, we use quarterly real private fixed investments and the aggregate credit spread is the difference between Moody's BBB and AAA. The data is at quarterly frequency and covers the period 1955.Q1 to 2009.Q2. In the model, we simulate 1,000 economies for 100 years each consisting of 3,000 firms. We run the same regression in the data and on simulated data. The risk neutral credit spread is the difference between the yield of corporate debt priced under the actual probability measure and the risk-free rate. We report t-statistics in parentheses which are based on Newey-West standard errors with 4 lags. 
